and forbidden, respectively, in judicial decision-making.) This criticism -that judges act unethically when they make decisions the basis of politics, not law -is familiar from highprofile cases such as the Bush v. Gore vote-recount litigation in 2000, and ruling by a federal 4 appeals court (subsequently reversed by the Supreme Court) that the inclusion of "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance recited in public schools is unconstitutional. In contrast with legal 5 decisions made by actors within the executive branch of government, in which policy and ideological factors may play a role, judicial decisions are supposed to be justified solely on the 6 basis of legal reasons.
The general theme of this paper is that the role of the judge, and the subject of judicial ethics, cannot be discussed in the abstract; the analysis must have a foundation in some view about the nature of law. Talking about "legal reasons" and criticizing judges for relying on nonlegal reasons presupposes a tenable distinction between the legal and non-legal domains. This, of course, is one of the principal points of contention between legal positivists and their critics.
If there is one position that unites the varieties of legal positivism, it is the distinction between what is law and what is not law is a social fact. If this is the case, then it is an empirical matter 7 to discover the content of the law -one simply looks at the relevant sources to determine what H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2d ed., 1994), pp. 126-29. 9 Id., pp. 135-36, 145-47. 10 Ronald Dworkin, "The Model of Rules I," in Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 11 University Press 1977), pp. [32] [33] [34] "Hard Cases, " in id., 4 of aims that may be embodied in a rule. When a judge encounters some gap in the law, where it 9 is clear that there is no correct answer to the legal question, the judge must exercise discretion, and will in effect create new law. Dworkin, by contrast, denies that a judge has discretion in 10 cases where the application of a legal rule seems indeterminate. If the judge's decision truly imposes duties on the parties, and is justified with reference to the parties' rights, then there must be some authoritative source of rights -legal rules, standards, or principles -that exists before the judge makes her decision, and controls the judge's her decision-making. Hart and Dworkin 11 agree that judges are duty-bound to follow the law and not make decisions on the basis of ideology or personal preferences where there is applicable law controlling the decision. The difference is that Dworkin thinks there is always applicable law controlling the decision, while
Hart believes there are cases in which judges permissibly "legislate," or make decisions on the basis of extra-legal considerations. For Dworkin to sustain this claim, however, he must first provide good reasons to believe that what look like extra-legal normative political reasons are actually part of the law.
The second area of discussion is the justification for certain restrictions imposed on judges by positive law (rules of judicial conduct, statutes, and court rules) often misleadingly referred to as rules of "judicial ethics." (Civilians may refer to these as the deontologie of judges.) At least in the United States, many of these restrictions purport to regulate bias and the 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). 
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risk that judges will not be impartial. For example, a federal statute permits a party to file a motion to disqualify a judge "in any proceeding where [the judge's] impartiality might reasonably be questioned." Courts applying the rules governing judicial conduct often regulate 12 prophylactically, by disqualifying judges from presiding over certain types of cases, based on conduct that is taken to be evidence of bias. This conduct can include speaking or writing publicly on controversial political and legal subjects, being a member or serving on the board of directors of an organization with a particular ideological viewpoint, or teaching at or attending continuing legal education seminars in which particular political views are expressed. One of the recurring areas of controversy in the application of these rules are cases in which the judge's alleged failure of impartiality is related to having controversial political or religious beliefs.
There are some interesting empirical issues which must be passed over here, including (1) the validity in general of the inference from conduct to stable dispositions or character traits that can be used to reliably predict future behavior -many cognitive psychologists argue that affirming the validity of that inference is a mistake, i.e. the "fundamental attribution error" ; (2) 13 the relevance of the law vs. judges' political attitudes as a basis for predicting judicial decisions -political scientists have proposed and tested an "attitudinal model" for predicting decisions, which asserts that political beliefs are a better predictor of judicial decisions than legal rules ; there is anything wrong with a judge basing a legal decision, in whole or in part, on the sorts of considerations that anti-bias rules focus on.
2.
Civilian and Common-Law Judges.
Before discussing these two issues, it is necessary to say something briefly on the difference between the judicial role in common-law and civil-law systems. It would not be appropriate (or at least it would not be very interesting) to present a paper at an international conference that focuses only on decision-making by common-law judges. However, it may seem to civilian lawyers that this entire question is misplaced, because the official view of judges in civil-law systems is that they do not engage in interpretation at all, but simply apply the code to the facts in a syllogistic way. The judicial role is to find the right provision of the code, and reason from that provision (the major premise), the facts (the minor premise), to the conclusion which follows as a matter of deductive logic. If there is any ambiguity in the code, the judge 16 should refer the question back to the legislature for resolution; to do otherwise would be a violation of the separation of powers between the judicial and legislative branches of Chamber, the lack of clarity in the law that had arisen around the issue of general damages, the value of human dignity that would be promoted by permitting the plaintiff in this case to recover, and pragmatic considerations such as the difficulty of evaluating general damages awards.
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American lawyers would recognize these considerations as exactly the sorts of policy reasonsi.e. middle-level principles of justice -that figure prominently in the discourse of common-law courts in tort cases. If this description of the French system in action is accurate, it serves as a caution not to rely too heavily on the simplistic picture of civil-law judges as mechanical decision-makers. The difference between the French and the American systems, as typical representatives of civil-law and common-law styles of adjudication, turns out to be in the candor with which judges disclose the basis for their decisions in public opinions. However, the two 9 systems are more similar than they may appear at first in terms of the extent to which judicial decision-making is not mechanical or algorithmic, and judges must exercise discretion when deciding cases. As a matter of legal theory, the same problem thus arises in both systemsnamely, what considerations are relevant to justifying a judicial decision. This is the philosophical problem with which this paper will be primarily concerned.
Legal Positivism and Judicial Discretion.
On the assumption that judicial decision-making is not mechanical, and that judges rely on considerations other than the plain meaning of statutory texts and (in common-law systems) a narrow reading of the holdings of precedent cases, how can we formulate a test for impartiality that differentiates between permissible and impermissible grounds for judicial decisions? For the purposes of this discussion, assume a case similar to the one described by Lasser -a tort issue concerning the recoverability of damages that might come before any appellate court. The 23 plaintiff seeks damages for emotional distress, as a result of having witnessed her husband, who was standing nearby, be struck by a car driven by the defendant. She testified that she feared for her own safety, even though she was not struck by the car. However, she was so frightened that she became physically ill. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's claim for damages, on the authority of a precedent case which held that a plaintiff cannot recover for emotional distress Ronald Dworkin, "Hard Cases, " in Taking Rights Seriously, supra, p. 84. 24 10 absent a physical impact upon the plaintiff. The reasons the court gave in the earlier case were as follows:
C A person is legally responsible only for the natural and proximate results of a negligent act. Physical illness is not the natural and proximate result of fright in a person of ordinary physical and mental vigor.
C Awarding damages for emotional injury is unfair because the defendant's liability will be out of proportion to the defendant's culpability.
C
The magnitude of emotional injuries tends to be unforeseeable. It is unfair to impose liability for unforeseeable harms, because there is no way the defendant could have anticipated and prevented them.
Permitting the plaintiff to recover for emotional distress in this case would "naturally result in a flood of litigation" because it is easy to feign emotional distress.
It is impossible to calculate the amount of recoverable damages without speculation and conjecture. (In the United States this argument has an institutional-competence aspect, because non-expert juries assign damages to the plaintiff, subject to some modification by the trial judge.)
The In the tort case example, "the law" consists most obviously of a rule -"no liability for emotional distress without physical impact." In addition to that rule, however, the law arguably consists of the reasons given by judges in support of that rule, as well as reasons given in other cases that tend to support the a very different rule. Other cases might have permitted recovery, albeit in circumstances that are factually distinguishable from the exact case before the court, citing reasons such as the importance of deterring wrongdoing; the injustice of permitting an injury to an innocent victim to go uncompensated; the anomaly that recovery for emotional distress is permitted in cases where there is some physical impact, however slight; and the ability of trial courts, using rules of evidence and their power to reduce excessive damage awards, to provide adequate guidance to juries in the assessment of damages. In our hypothetical, it is unclear how a judge should decide the case. Some judges might read the precedent case narrowly, and deny recovery to the plaintiff; other judges might read the precedent case more broadly and permit the plaintiff to recover damages. We recognize the possibility of a reasoned normative political theory requires including a given reason as part of the grounds of the law, but she could also be asking, in effect, whether normative political theory entails standards for applying the law that gives that consideration greater weight in judicial deliberations.
(3) The "official" theory of judging embraced by the civil law -that the judge is merely "the mouth that pronounces the words of the law" -would admit no uncertainty with respect 42 to either the grounds of law or the methods of its application. Comparative law scholars have shown, however, that judges may write as if legal judgments were exercises in deductive logical reasoning, but in fact there is a great deal of ambiguity and uncertainty in the law, and therefore room for discretionary decision-making by judges. Because of the open texture of language, general rules can never determine their own application; thus, adhering to the "official" theory of mechanical judging has only the effect of disguising the need for the exercise of discretion.
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(4) The radical indeterminacy thesis, associated with some strands of the American legal realist and critical legal studies movements, is that law does not constrain the decisions of judges.
The domains of law and politics are extensionally identical, so to the extent judges seem to be appealing to specifically legal norms, they are doing so merely to camouflage the true, political, basis of their decision. There are numerous well known problems with this position. For one for the normativity of law -that is, its capacity to create obligations on the part of judges to justify their decisions on the grounds of law. A related problem, which will be important to the discussion of judging in good faith, in the following section, is that the claim of radical indeterminacy confuses causal explanations with justifications of judicial decisions. A reason 46 that may be given as an explanation of a judicial decision (e.g. that a judge has a particular partisan or ideological commitment) may be insufficient as a justification.
To see how this jurisprudential issue makes a practical difference in judicial ethics, imagine two different judges considering the hypothetical tort case. One is ideologically committed to the free market, distrusts government regulation, thinks industries do a fairly good job of voluntary compliance with reasonable norms of public safety, believes in principles of individual liberty and personal responsibility, and resists any attempt to redistribute wealth on a more egalitarian basis. The second judge take a dim view of the willingness of businesses to comply with their social responsibilities and cannot be trusted with self-regulation, believes that market failure and consumer irrationality justify more extensive government regulation, and abhors gross inequalities of wealth and favors progressive taxation and income redistribution.
(In the United States these positions correspond roughly with the Republican and Democratic parties, respectively, so for convenience we can refer to these judges as the Republican and Democratic judges.) The ethical question would be uninteresting, however, if it were the case either that the law were perfectly determinate or it were completely indeterminate. If position (4) were correct and these two judges could decide the case on basis of their ideological convictions and not be deemed to have reached a legally incorrect result, then presumably they would simply follow their political preferences and provide a post hoc legal justification. On the other hand, if
position (3) were correct and the application of the law to the facts of this case was a matter of syllogistic deduction, the political viewpoints of the judges would be irrelevant, as any competent reasoner would reach the same conclusion.
There are interesting questions of judicial ethics only if, as I believe is the case, legal decision-making is neither a species of deductive logic nor subject to the unconstrained whims or purely political beliefs of judges. In that case, judges can disagree in good faith about the right decision in hard cases. The Hart/Dworkin debate boils down to the question of what judges are doing when they disagree about the right decision in hard cases. Position (1), above, represents Dworkin's argument that the disagreement is over whether some consideration is part of the law or not. Position (2) takes the content of the law as given by social sources, and maintains that the disagreement is over how legal reasons should be prioritized or balanced. Normative political (i.e. non-legal) arguments within these positions pertain to whether something ought to be Dworkin, Law's Empire, supra, p. 248 ("he must decide which interpretation shows the legal record to 47 be the best it can be from the standpoint of substantive political morality").
Id., p. 240.
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Id., p. 256.
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Id., pp. 260-61. Id., pp. 297-98.
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Id., p. 301.
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Hart, supra, pp. 132-36. the legal system or the administration of justice" is presumptively permitted. Id., Canon 4C(3). However, this permission is qualified by the requirement that membership not cast reasonable doubt on the judge's capacity to act impartially. Id., Canon 4C(3), cmt.
[2]. 20 judicial craft that constrain the way they weigh and prioritize the reasons identified (via social facts) as part of the law, they may reach the same decision. However, neither of these sources of constraint on judicial discretion seem adequate. Unless the community speaks with one voice on matters of justice, there is unlikely to be a consensus for a conscientious judge to discover. The judge would therefore be forced to select some aspect of the community's pluralistic, perhaps even contradictory, discourse about justice as the community's "real" political morality. At this point the neutral discovery of social facts has ended and the judge is engaging in political argumentation. Appeals to a non-political craft of judging as the exercise of Aristotelian practical wisdom run into the same problem of pluralism. Judgment for Aristotle is always exercised with reference to some end of the practice in question, but in most political communities there are multiple competing ends served by the law.
Justifying Rules of Judicial Ethics.
The positive law of judicial ethics is aimed at minimizing the effect of the judge's political views on the outcomes of cases. For example, the American Bar Association's Model afoul of these rules by, for example, writing op-ed pieces in the newspaper criticizing another court's decision, advocating for a change in the law, or campaigning for judicial office on a political platform that explicitly or implicitly suggests the outcome in certain cases. In each instance, the rationale behind the rule is that the judge's speech or conduct indicates an inability to decide cases impartially.
In the United States, where judges are either elected or appointed in highly public, contentious processes, judges and candidates for judicial office typically declare that they are able to set aside their political beliefs and decided cases "on the law." (Supreme Court confirmation hearings are replete with incantatory statements by the nominee and his supporters that if confirmed, he will "follow the law as enacted by the legislature and not make new law based on his personal opinions.") However, the discussion of the Hart/Dworkin debate was intended to show that the political viewpoints of judges may necessarily influence the outcomes of cases. In Dworkin's view, judging is inherently a political practice, because ascertaining the content of law is impossible without resort to normative political argument. In Hart's view, by contrast, it is possible to ascertain the content of law empirically, but there may be a further normative question about the best way to prioritize or balance competing legal considerations.
The problem is, therefore, whether there is any point to having legal rules that seek to prevent the influence of politics on judging.
One way to answer this question in the affirmative would be to claim there is a difference between reasons of political morality that are relevant to deciding cases (Dworkin's reasons of "principle") and political viewpoints that are irrelevant to the law (Dworkin's reasons of "policy"). Judges who relied on excluded policy reasons could be sanctioned for failure of impartiality, while preserving the ability of judges to rely on included reasons of principle in deciding cases. But Dworkin's own argument shows that this is an untenable strategy. The principles/policy distinction would have to be drawn either by something like Hart's rule of recognition, which differentiates law from non-law as a matter of social fact, or by substantive political argument. As noted above, Dworkin favors the latter strategy, but if moral arguments are required to ascertain the content of law, then it seems unfair for any theorist to exclude a category of reasons ab initio. To do so would be to beg the question the argument is aimed at I believe the right approach to judicial ethics is to focus on the application side of the distinction between the content of law (which may or may not be susceptible of determination on the basis of social facts) and standards for its application. Where there are multiple plausible interpretations of existing cases, statutes, and other applicable legal norms, all we can reasonably expect is that a judge deliberate in good faith and reach the conclusion she believes represents the Greenawalt, supra, p. 377. 60 Dworkin, Law 's Empire, supra, pp. 185, 24 best reading of the governing law. The subject of judicial ethics is essentially an attempt to 60 flesh out the idea of judging in good faith. That, I suggest, is fundamentally about being prepared to give reasons in justification of a judicial decision. Labeling these reasons as "legal"
or "political" is less helpful than simply requiring judges to articulate them, to a real or hypothetical audience of competent observers. As long as a judge's ideological beliefs are germane to legal interpretation, I see no reason to regard judging on this basis as a failure of impartiality, as long as the judge in question is prepared to justify her decision as a constructive interpretation of authoritative texts (cases, statutes, regulations, and the like) in light of the political principles that would best explain and justify them. If the argument given by the judge 61 refers to the sorts of reasons that other judges, lawyers, and legal scholars tend to find persuasive as justifications, then the judge is acting ethically. If the only basis for a judge's decision was that she thought the result was more socially desirable, or accorded with her ideological commitments, the judge's decision would be unjustifiable to others. It is important to see that a judge is not required to persuade observers that her decision is the only right one; it is enough for the judge to give reasons to believe that her interpretation is a plausible one, which could be reached on the basis of the reasons given.
Legal systems may be expected to vary in the institutional mechanisms they employ to ensure that a judge's decision is defensible on the basis of legal reasons. In common law systems, judges in appellate courts are ordinarily expected to publish written opinions giving Lasser, supra, p. 191 . If failures of judicial impartiality are kept in check by institutional mechanisms that require reason-giving by judges, there seems to be little point in having rules of judicial ethics that regulate the political speech and affiliation of judges. In the United States at least, there is a tendency for these rules to obscure the real issues in judicial ethics. For example, Justice Scalia was criticized for stating in a speech to a conservative audience that he believed it was not a violation of the constitutional separation of church and state to require public school children to state their allegiance to one nation "under God." He subsequently voluntarily recused himself from deciding a case questioning the constitutionality of requiring children to recite the pledge, concluding that his impartiality could reasonably be questioned. The Supreme Court reversed a federal appeals court's decision that the pledge's "under God" language was unconstitutional, and legal scholars for the most part agreed that its decision was correct as a matter of constitutional law. In other words, Scalia's position was correct -or at the very least defensible in good faith -as an interpretation of the governing law. His vote might have been causally determined by his political commitments or his religious beliefs, but it was justifiable on the basis of law. The Supreme Court decision reversing the lower court was unanimous, including four judges generally regarded as left-leaning, two centrists, and two conservatives. Thus, a rule requiring Justice Scalia's disqualification in this case seems overinclusive. Rules that sweep this broadly may be justified in legal systems which do not have effective institutional mechanisms for ensuring that a decision is justifiable on legal grounds. In the systems with which I am familiar, however, the requirement that judges give reasons for their decisions is a sufficient guarantee of impartiality.
